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Abstract
In 1994, Maudlin proposed an objection to retrocausal approaches
to quantum mechanics in general, and to the transactional interpre-
tation (TI) in particular, involving an absorber that changes location
depending on the trajectory of the particle. Maudlin considered this
objection fatal. However, the TI did not die; rather, a number of re-
sponses were developed, some attempting to accommodate Maudlins
example within the existing TI, and others modifying the TI. I argue
that none of these responses is fully adequate. The reason, I submit,
is that there are two aspects to Maudlins objection; the more readily
soluble aspect has received all the attention, but the more problematic
aspect has gone unnoticed. I consider the prospects for developing a
successful retrocausal quantum theory in light of this second aspect of
the objection.
1 Retrocausal quantum mechanics
Cramers (1986) transactional interpretation (TI) begins from the observa-
tion that relativistic versions of the quantum mechanical equation of motion
admit both retarded solutions waves propagating towards the future and
advanced solutions waves propagating towards the past. The advanced so-
lutions are usually discarded as unrealistic, but Cramer suggests incorporat-
ing them into an interpretation of quantum mechanics.
As a simple illustration, let us apply the TI to the experiment shown in
gure 1. A particle is emitted by a source S at time t0, passes through
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Figure 1: A simple experiment.
a symmetric beam-splitter BS, and is absorbed either by absorber A or by
absorber B at time t1. According to the TI, at t0 the source emits a retarded
wave the o¤er wave in the direction of the beam splitter, where it is split
into two equal-amplitude components that travel to A and B respectively.
The arrival of an o¤er wave at A at t1 triggers the emission of an advanced
wave of the same amplitude and phase the conrmation wave travelling
back towards the source at t0. The same process occurs at B. So there
are now two equal-amplitude o¤er-conrmation pairs between the emitter
and the absorbers, one going to A and one to B. These are regarded as
competing possible transactions; one of them becomes actual and the other
does not. This is a fundamentally indeterministic process, and the chance
of each possible transaction becoming actual is given by the product of the
o¤er wave amplitude and the conrmation wave amplitude. In this case, each
completed transaction has a probability of 1/2. If the completed transaction
is between the source and absorber A, then the particle goes to A, and
similarly for B.
The incorporation of advanced waves is mathematically satisfying because
it avoids throwing away half the solutions to the equation of motion. But
it also allows a uniform treatment of several puzzling quantum phenomena,
treated at length in Cramer (1986). In particular, since the advanced con-
rmation wave can transmit information about the measurements that are
to be performed on a particle back in time to the particle source, no non-
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local inuences are required to explain the results of EPR-Bell experiments
(1986, 667). Several other interpretations of quantum mechanics have been
developed to exploit this retrocausal strategy, including those of Price (1994),
Sutherland (2008) and Wharton (2010).
But the TI and other retrocausal approaches are challenged by Maudlin
(1994). Maudlin o¤ers two arguments, an initial objection is aimed at the
particular theoretical structure of the TI, and a more general challenge aimed
at retrocausal theories in general. I will take them in turn.
2 Pseudotime and explanation
Maudlins initial objection concerns the status of the pseudotime narrative
the TI story about how the transaction is established. On the surface, at
least, the pseudotime narrative provides the central explanatory mechanism
of the TI; o¤er waves are sent forwards in time from the particle source to
the potential absorbers, and then each absorber returns a conrmation wave
backwards in time to the source, and then one o¤er-conrmation pair at
random becomes the completed transaction. Maudlin regards this explana-
tory mechanism as problematic. The locution and thenin the pseudotime
narrative cannot be understood temporally, because the events connected by
this locution zigzag back and forth in time. Neither can it be understood
causally, because only the completed transaction actually exists, so the o¤er-
conrmation process that precedes it in the pseudotime narrative never ac-
tually occurs. But then how should we understand it? Cramer himself backs
away from taking the pseudotime narrative literally, describing it as only a
semantic convenience, a useful ction (1986, 663). Maudlins rst objection
to the TI is that Cramer cannot a¤ord to make such a concession. Taken
literally, the pseudotime narrative is incoherent, but since all of the seeming
illumination provided by the account depends on the pseudotime narrative,
the TI without the narrative fails as an explanatory theory (1994, 198).
But is Maudlin right that the pseudotime narrative provides all the illu-
mination of the TI? This seems unfair, as immediately following Cramers
concession that the pseudotime narrative is a useful ction he provides an
alternative way of understanding the TI that makes no appeal to the pseudo-
time narrative whatsoever: An equally valid interpretation of the process is
that a four-vector standing wave has been established between emitter and
absorber (1986, 663). That is, given that nature contains both advanced
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and retarded waves, and given that the arrival of a retarded o¤er wave trig-
gers the emission of an advanced conrmation wave and vice versa, what we
should expect to see is a standing wave between the source and an absorber
composed of an advanced and a retarded component. After all, anything
other than a standing wave would be inconsistent, ascribing distinct wave
amplitudes successively to one and the same spacetime point. Hence one
can bypass the pseudotime narrative, and simply appeal to consistency as an
explanation of the completed transactions one sees. The advanced and re-
tarded waves of the TI have a crucial role in this explanation, as components
of the standing wave, but this role is not the one they play in the pseudotime
narrative.
However, the standing wave explanation does not yield the probabilities
with which we see each of the possible completed transactions, so in this
sense the explanation is incomplete. But quantum probabilities are rarely
explained; except for a controversial research program in many-worlds quan-
tum mechanics (Deutsch 1999), quantum theories typically stipulate a rule
for ascribing probabilities to outcomes rather than explaining that rule. So
the TI is in good company here. Perhaps the easiest way to state the rule
is in terms of the pseudotime narrative; if an o¤er wave from the source
were to produce conrmation waves from every absorber, the probability of
a transaction is the product of the amplitudes of the o¤er and conrmation
waves connecting the source to the relevant absorber. But this appeal to
a fragment of the pseudotime narrative is entirely instrumental; it simply
provides a straightforward mathematical recipe for assigning probabilities to
trajectories.
So Maudlin is wrong that the pseudotime narrative is essential to the TI;
one can eliminate the pseudotime narrative as a causal explanation without
sacricing the illumination that the TI approach provides. But Maudlin is
also remiss, I think, in implying that the pseudotime narrative can provide
no illumination because it is an inconsistent ction. Fictions, even inconsis-
tent ones, can provide a kind of illumination. In particular, the pseudotime
narrative provides a way to come to the realization that only a standing
wave solution is possible, even if it cannot be the causal mechanism by which
those standing waves come about. So it seems entirely apt for Cramer to
describe the pseudotime narrative as a semantic convenience and a peda-
gogical convention(1986, 661); nothing like the pseudotime narrative could
actually occur as a causal process, but nevertheless this ction is a good way
for students to discover for themselves why standing wave solutions are what
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Figure 2: Maudlins experiment.
we observe, and in this way the ction provides illumination.
So Maudlins initial complaint against the TI is, I think, misplaced. But
he does not rest his case on this objection, since the pseudotime narrative
and its problems are peculiar to Cramers theory, and might well not arise in
some other account which employs backward causation(1994, 199). Rather,
since he intends to rule out retrocausal theories more broadly, he rests his
case on a nal problem of greater scope which will arise for any stochastic
theory of this sort(1994, 199). This is the challenge to which I now turn.
3 Maudlins challenge
Consider the experiment shown schematically in gure 2. A particle is
emitted at S at time t0. If it follows the lower path it is detected by absorber
A at time t1. If it follows the upper path then A does not detect a particle at
t1, which triggers an absorber B to be swung from its initial position behind
A to a point on the upper path, where it detects the particle at a later
time t2. Now what happens if (by means of the beam-splitter BS) a particle
is produced in a symmetric superposition of following the lower and upper
paths? Standard quantum mechanics tells us that there is a 50% chance that
the particle is detected at A and absorber B stays put, and a 50% chance
that absorber B swings round and the particle is detected at B.
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How can the TI account for these statistics? Consider rst what hap-
pens if one attempts to apply the pseudotime narrative. The puzzle here is
that the equiprobability of the two outcomes demands that equal amplitude
conrmation waves be received from absorber A and absorber B. But if B
sends back a conrmation wave, then it must have been struck by an o¤er
wave, so it must have swung round. And if it has swung round, then the
particle is not detected at A. So when a conrmation wave is received from
absorber B, the particle must always go to absorber B, despite the fact that
the o¤er-conrmation amplitude product is 1/2. That is, even considered as
a useful ction the pseudotime narrative fails us, since it assigns inconsistent
probabilities to one and the same event.
Nor does the TI fare much better if we attempt to apply the standing-
wave interpretation instead. There is no problem with the standing waves
themselves; one consistent solution is a standing wave from S to A along
the lower path, and the other is a standing wave from S to B along the
upper path. The problem is that the recipe for ascribing probabilities to
these outcomes is precisely the inconsistent fragment of the pseudotime nar-
rative just discussed; the particle denitely goes to B if it has a probability
of 1/2 of going to B. The inconsistency arises because the conguration of
the absorbers is contingent the location of B depends on what happens at
A whereas the TI takes the conguration of absorbers as xed boundary
conditions. As Maudlin notes, the TI recipe for ascribing probabilities as-
sumes that the absorbers represent a xed eld of possibilities among which
the emitter can choose(1994, 199). If the absorbers arent xed, the recipe
yields inconsistent results.
This di¢ culty is not limited to the TI, but applies to any theory that
incorporates both advanced and retarded causal inuences. Just as the re-
tarded causal inuences are ill-dened without a xed conguration of parti-
cle sources, so the advanced causal inuences are ill-dened without a xed
conguration of particle absorbers. In Maudlins example, the absorbers
move based on earlier events, so no single set of advanced inuences can be
ascribed to the system. But neither can one ascribe one set of advanced
inuences at one time and another set of advanced inuences at another, on
pain of contradiction. Maudlin concludes that Cramers theory collapses
(1994, 200), and since any theory in which both backwards and forwards
inuences conspire to shape events will face this same challenge(1994, 201),
the entire retrocausal program in quantum mechanics collapses too.
But the TI has not collapsed; a variety of responses have been developed,
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either claiming to accommodate Maudlins example within the existing TI,
or modifying the TI to accommodate it. I run through these responses in
the next section, and argue that none of them is satisfactory. The reason,
I contend, is that there are two elements to Maudlins challenge that have
not been clearly distinguished. Distinguishing them allows us to evaluate the
TI much more clearly; some aspects of it can remain in an adequate theory,
while other aspects must be modied. Neither has the retrocausal program
in quantum mechanics collapsed; indeed it is ourishing through the work
of Price (1994), Sutherland (2008) and Wharton (2010), among others. The
evaluation of the TI in light of Maudlins challenge allows us to judge these
alternative retrocausal approaches as well.
4 Extant responses
Of the extant responses to Maudlins challenge, Berkovitz (2002), Kastner
(2006) and Marchildon (2006) attempt to accommodate Maudlins exam-
ple within the existing TI, and Cramer (2005), Chiatti (2012) and Kastner
(2012b, 2013) work with modied versions of the TI. I will start with the
former.
Berkovitz (2002) points out that given common views about probabilistic
causality, the TI applied to Maudlins example involves a causal loop, since
the conrmation wave returning backwards in time from B is necessary (and
su¢ cient) for the particle to be emitted towards B. Berkovitz then notes that
in causal loops the relative frequencies of events can di¤er signicantly from
their objective chances. So in this case, the fact that the particle always takes
the upper path when B swings round is not inconsistent with the upper path
having an objective chance of 1/2. However, it is not clear that Berkovitz
intends his analysis as a defense of the TI; he notes that since the link between
objective chance and long-run frequency is broken, the TI fails to predict the
long-run frequencies of outcomes. Rather than containing an inconsistent
recipe for ascribing probabilities to outcomes, the TI contains no such recipe
at all. This is not a way forward for the advocate of the TI.
Kastner (2006) identies the following as a problematic aspect of Maudlins
example; if absorber B does not swing round, then the o¤er wave on the upper
path heads into space, and no conrmation wave is received from the upper
path at the source. Typically in the TI, the conrmation waves returning
from a complete set of absorbers cancel out to the past of the initial emission
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event. But in this case, the absence of a conrmation wave from the upper
path means that the conrmation wave from the lower path propagates into
the past, prior to t0. On the other hand, if B does swing round, then there is
a complete set of absorbers, and the conrmation waves do cancel out prior
to t0.
The lesson Kastner takes from this is that the emission event is not suit-
able as a starting-point for the TI analysis, since this event and its past
depend on whether B swings round or not, i.e. on the outcome of the exper-
iment. Instead, Kastner takes the o¤er-conrmation wave pair on the lower
path as the starting point of her analysis, since this pair exists whether B
swings round or not. The conrmation wave here has an amplitude of 1=
p
2,
and so Kastner reasons that the corresponding transaction in which the
particle takes the lower path where it is absorbed by A has a probability of
1/2. But the only other possibility is that the particle takes the upper path
where it is absorbed by B, so this also must have a probability of 1/2. This
recovers the standard quantum mechanical probabilities. However, note that
the probability of absorption by B is obtained by elimination: it must be 1/2
because the probability of absorption by A is 1/2. But Maudlins challenge
is to show how the mechanism of the TI generates these probabilities. Kast-
ner has not explained why a conrmation wave from B always produces a
completed transaction, even though its amplitude is 1=
p
2. Hence Maudlins
challenge has not been addressed.
Marchildon (2006) notes that when B does not swing round, the o¤er wave
along the upper path is still absorbed somewhere; a particle taking this path
would be absorbed by something eventually. Due to the retrocausal nature
of the pseudotime sequence, it makes no di¤erence how far in the future this
absorption event lies; the conrmation wave is still received by the particle
source at t0. One may as well assume that there is a third absorber C,
situated on the upper path beyond the point B swings to. Hence a complete
set of conrmation waves is received at the particle source whether or not B
swings round, and in either case the conrmation waves cancel out prior to
t0.
Maudlins example remains problematic, however; if B does not swing
round, the new absorber C returns a conrmation wave with amplitude 1=
p
2,
and yet no transaction is ever completed with C. Marchildon attempts to
dissolve this problem by appealing to the four-dimensional spacetime implicit
in the TI; the future, though not predictable, is well dened(2006, 427).
The four-dimensional block universe is subject to consistency conditions, and
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in the present case, these conditions are that B absorbs the particle if and
only if A does not absorb it(2006, 427). Given this consistency condition,
there are just two possible trajectories, and each is ascribed the probability
corresponding to the product of the amplitudes of their respective o¤er and
conrmation waves, i.e. 1/2.
Marchildon is right that there are two possibilities in spacetime; these
are the four-dimensional standing waves discussed above. But recall that
the ascription of probabilities to these possibilities requires an appeal to a
fragment of the pseudotime narrative, even if it is only taken as an instru-
mental recipe. Marchildons account retains the inconsistency in this recipe
regarding absorber B; absorber B denitely receives the particle if it has a
probability of 1/2 of doing so. Furthermore, his account adds a new in-
consistency regarding absorber C; absorber C denitely does not receive the
particle when it has a probability of 1/2 of doing so. The contradiction at
the heart of Maudlins challenge remains.
So maybe there is no way to accommodate Maudlins example within the
TI as it stands; if we want to rescue the theory, perhaps we need to modify the
recipe for ascribing probabilities to outcomes. Cramer (2005) attempts to do
just that by modifying the way that pseudotime explanations are constructed.
In the standard TI, all possible transactions have the same status; what
Cramer proposes instead is a hierarchy of possible transactions, ordered by
the spacetime interval covered by the transaction. That is, transactions with
shorter spacetime interval are given the opportunity to form or not form
before (in pseudotime) those with longer spacetime interval. This takes
care of Maudlins example, since the possible transaction with absorber A
is decided rst. The pseudotime sequence now goes like this: The o¤er-
conrmation pair to absorber A is treated rst, and since the product of
their amplitudes is 1/2, there is a probability of 1/2 of a transaction forming
with A. If it fails to form, then absorber B swings round, and the o¤er-
conrmation pair to absorber B can be considered; it too has an amplitude
product of 1/2, corresponding to a probability 1/2 of this transaction forming.
But the hierarchical pseudotime sequence envisioned here is not a general
solution to the problem. For one thing, it will not work for Maudlin-type
experiments involving photons, since in that case the spacetime interval for
every possible transaction will be zero.1 For another, it seems to have dif-
1David Miller made this point during the TI Cyber-Roundtableorganised by Ruth
Kastner (MarchAugust 2011).
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culty handling interference experiments. Consider a two-path interference
experiment (using particles other than photons) in which one path is exactly
one wavelength longer than the other. According to Cramers proposal, one
considers the possible transaction along the shorter path rst. This transac-
tion has a 50% chance of forming, and if it forms, then no transaction forms
along the longer path. But this is inadequate to the phenomena; it is crucial
to the empirical adequacy of the TI that the transaction in interference situ-
ations forms along both paths simultaneously. In interference situations, the
spacetime interval of the two possible paths has to be irrelevant to transaction
formation.
Chiatti (2012) regards the TI pseudotime sequence as superuous, since
he thinks that the structure of transactions can be found within the formal-
ism of standard quantum mechanics. The way to do this, he argues, is to
adopt an ontology of particle creation/destruction events; these are the only
events that physically exist, and the TI o¤er and conrmation waves are
a mathematical ction suited to calculate the statistics of the connection
between a pair of events (2012, 2). The physical universe is regarded as a
network of particle creation/destruction events, with the TI o¤er and conr-
mation waves serving only to coordinate the statistical relations among these
events.
Chiatti claims that in this context, Maudlins argument is unfounded be-
cause the two possible transactions have di¤erent events at their extremities;
absorption by A is a di¤erent event than absorption by B. Di¤erent extremal
events entail di¤erent TI-style analyses, and hence we have two simple ap-
plications of the theory, not one paradoxical one. This decoupling of the
problem fails to show how the event of B-absorption is related to that of A-
absorption. However, Chiatti has a suggestion here, namely that the event
(not A)+(not A)  is itself a transaction termination (null interaction), so
that the second transaction assumes as its input the output state of the
rst(2012, 28). The suggestion is that the event of a particle not being ab-
sorbed by A can serve as the terminal event of a transaction, with probability
1/2, and this event can also serve as the initial event of a second transaction
that ends with a particle absorbed by B. The trouble with this suggestion is
that a null interaction a particle failing to be destroyed is not a physical
event in Chiattis ontology, so it is hard to see how it can serve as the ter-
minal event in a transaction. There are not two back-to-back transactions
here, but a single transaction with a complex structure.
The most persistent and innovative developer of the TI is Kastner (2010,
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2012a, 2012b, 2013). Kastner suggests that the way to retain the status of
pseudotime histories as genuine explanations is to adopt a particular kind
of modal realist ontology. Standard TI is most straightforwardly interpreted
as entailing that only one of the potential transactions represented by the
o¤er waves exists. Kastner, on the other hand, insists that all the potential
transactions exist in a real space of possibilities; she calls the resulting theory
possibilist TI(PTI). One of these potential transactions becomes actual:
when the experiment lies in the future, there are multiple potential trans-
actions between the emission event and the various possible absorbers, but
when the experiment lies in the past there is just a single actual completed
transaction from the emitter to one of the absorbers. Hence PTI must be
embedded within a dynamic A-theory account of time.
Of course, simply reifying the possible transactions does not help address
Maudlins challenge in fact, it brings his criticism into sharper focus, since
the alleged inconsistencies in the pseudotime sequence are now inconsistencies
among real events. Rather, Kastner uses her PTI to respond to Maudlins
challenge in two related ways. First, she argues that Maudlins challenge
is no more problematic for the PTI than delayed-choice experiments are for
standard quantum mechanics, since the problematic event structure is the
same in both cases (2013, 97101). However, this argument only succeeds to
the extent that it is agreed that delayed choice experiments are not problem-
atic for standard quantum mechanics. This is far from a foregone conclusion;
Cramer notably takes the problems that delayed-choice experiments pose for
standard quantum mechanics as one of his motivations for developing the TI
(1986, 671). Furthermore, since standard quantum mechanics su¤ers from
the measurement problem, the relevant class of theories with which to com-
pare PTI consists of those that solve the measurement problem Bohms
theory, the GRW theory and Everettian approaches and none of these the-
ories is troubled by either delayed-choice experiments or Maudlins challenge.
The fact that PTI is in no worse shape than standard quantum mechanics is
not by itself very reassuring.
However, Kastner also has a more direct defense of the PTI fromMaudlins
challenge, adapting Wheelers defense of standard quantum mechanics from
the challenge posed by delayed-choice experiments. This strategy is to admit
the possibility that the past might be indeterminate in some specied sense.
Maudlin assumes that a complete set of conrmation waves at the emitter
(i.e. a set whose combined probability is 1) is required for the consistency of
the theory. Kastner proposes instead that the set of conrmation waves re-
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ceived at the emitter is simply indeterminate, even at times after t0 when the
emission event lies in the past (2013, 101). This is because the conrmation
waves depend on the conguration of absorbers, and at times between t0 and
t1 the conguration of absorbers is itself indeterminate. At time t1 when the
lower o¤er wave arrives at potential absorber A, a conrmation wave with
amplitude 1=
p
2 is returned to the emitter. There is a corresponding chance
of 1/2 that this o¤er-conrmation pair will form a completed transaction to
A. If it does not, then absorber B swings into position, a conrmation wave
with amplitude 1=
p
2 is returned from this absorber to the emitter as well,
and a transaction forms between the emitter and absorber B. In the latter
case, Kastner squares the denite formation of a transaction to B with the
o¤er-conrmation amplitude product of 1/2 by arguing that the amplitude
product refers to the frequency of this outcome among repeated trials, not
to the chance of this very conrmation wave producing a transaction (2013,
96).
Kastners reconceptualization of the TI has certainly advanced the debate
on a number of fronts, but the response to Maudlins challenge is not fully
satisfactory. First, the dynamic nature of the possibility space is problematic,
even by the standards of A-theories of time. Prior to t1, absorption by B
is not a physical possibility (absorber B receives no o¤er wave), but after
t1 absorption by B becomes a physical possibility. Even if one if prepared
to admit that physical possibilities disappear as time marches on (because
one of them becomes actual), it is harder to see how physical possibilities can
appear ; surely if an event at t2 is physically possible as of t1, it was physically
possible as of all earlier times as well. Second, Kastners interpretation of
conrmation wave amplitude seems at odds with her insistence that the realm
of future possibilities is physically e¢ cacious(2013, 68). It is easy to see
how the conrmation wave from A is physically e¢ cacious: its arrival at
the emitter generates the chance of the corresponding transaction forming,
where the chance is equal to the amplitude product. But the conrmation
wave from B is not physically e¢ cacious in the same way: its arrival does not
trigger a chance of 1/2 of the transaction forming, despite the fact that the
amplitude product is 1/2. Rather, the transaction always forms on arrival
of this conrmation wave, and its amplitude product is to be interpreted as
merely an indication of a frequency in a hypothetical ensemble rather than as
a causal factor. That is, the role of the conrmation wave in bringing about
the completed transaction with the corresponding probability is undermined.
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Figure 3: Maudlins experiment, quantum version.
5 The rst challenge
It looks like none of the extant responses to Maudlins challenge are fully
adequate. The feature of Maudlins argument to which all commentators
have been attempting to respond is the contingent nature of the absorber
structure the fact that the locations of the absorbers depend on the trajec-
tory of the particle. This is not surprising, since Maudlin himself describes
his challenge in these terms: This picture depends crucially on the idea
that the absorbers are somehow just sitting out there in the future, waiting
to absorb... But there is no reason for the absorbers to be xed in the future,
una¤ected by everything that happens in the present (1994, 199). How-
ever, I think the contingent structure of the absorbers is only one element of
Maudlins challenge, and not the most problematic one.
First, note that Maudlins experiment involves a mixed quantum/classical
system; the particle is a quantum system, but the movable absorber is a clas-
sical (macroscopic) system. This, though, looks like an expendable feature of
Maudlins example; one could make all the subsystems quantum mechanical,
and still retain the contingent absorber structure. For example, consider the
variant of the experiment shown in gure 3. If a particle is emitted along the
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lower path, it collides with a carefully-timed incoming antiparticle (dotted
line) at t1. The two particles annihilate, and one of the resulting photons is
detected at A. If a particle is emitted along the upper path, then clearly the
antiparticle doesnt encounter it at t1; instead, the antiparticle travels on,
and collides with the particle at a later time t2 on the upper path. This time
one of the resulting photons is detected at B.2
The moving parts in this version of Maudlins experiment are all quan-
tum systems, but the absorber structure is just as in the original version,
with the antiparticle playing the role of the moving absorber. There is a
slight di¤erence, namely that in the original version there are two absorbers,
one of which moves, whereas in the new version there is just one moving
absorber. But this is unimportant; in the original version, it could just as
well be absorber A that moves to the upper path when it fails to detect
a particle on the lower path. So if it is the contingent absorber structure
that is the problematic aspect of Maudlins example, it ought to be just as
problematic in this version. But it does not appear so; one can construct a
fairly straightforward pseudotime narrative in this case that yields the right
probabilities.
Here is how it goes. A particle and an anti-particle are emitted at the
beginning of the experiment, so let us write the initial o¤er wave as jOip jOia.
The o¤er wave for the particle is split by the beam-splitter into two equal
components, following the lower path and upper path respectively; at this
stage, we can write the total o¤er wave as
1p
2

jLip + jUip

jOia : (1)
The o¤er wave for the antiparticle travels towards the lower path, where it is
split into two terms depending on whether it meets the particle on the lower
path or not. That is, the term jLip jOia in (1) evolves to jLip jLia, where
2In electron-positron annihilation two photons are produced; for simplicity I have only
shown one in the diagram. One might object to calling the antiparticle an absorber, since
it no longer exists after the absorption event; nevertheless, there are two absorption events
with the same contingent structure as in Maudlins example. Finally, some proponents
of the TI insist that absorbers must be macroscopic objects, either because transactions
are irreversible (Boisvert and Marchildon 2013, 306) or because only a macroscopic object
absorbs with (practical) certainty (Kastner 2013, 65). However, since the collapse process
is not a literal spacetime process in the TI, there seems little motivation to insist that
transactions are irreversible. Similarly, as long as an entity absorbs in this particular
experiment, there seems little motivation to insist that it was almost certain to do so.
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jLia is an o¤er wave for the antiparticle that encounters the particle on the
lower path. The term jUip jOia in (1) evolves to jUip jUia, where jUia is an
o¤er wave for the antiparticle that travels onwards through the lower path
and encounters the particle on the upper path. Hence the superposition state
(1) as a whole evolves to the later(in pseudotime) superposition state
1p
2

jLip jLia + jUip jUia

: (2)
Each term returns a conrmation wave from the point at which the parti-
cle and antiparticle annihilate; the rst term returns a conrmation wave
1p
2
hLjp hLja, and the second term returns a conrmation wave 1p2 hU jp hU ja.
Hence the (dual) source receives two conrmation waves, each with ampli-
tude 1=
p
2, and a transaction forms along one of the o¤er-conrmation pairs
with probability 1=2 each. This pseudotime narrative hence successfully as-
cribes probabilities of 1=2 each to the two possible transactions the one in
which the particles annihilate on the lower path, and the one in which they
annihilate on the upper path.
Of course, one still may not want to take the pseudotime narrative lit-
erally, since the sequence of events it describes is neither a temporal nor a
causal one. The point is that the pseudotime narrative provides a consis-
tent recipe for ascribing probabilities to the two four-dimensional standing
waves that are the completed transactions. Hence the TI can account for the
standard quantum probabilities in contingent-absorber experiments without
any new di¢ culties or any modications. Why, then, has Maudlins example
been taken to be so problematic?
6 The second challenge
The reason is that the contingent absorber structure in Maudlins example
is not instantiated by quantum systems, but by classical (macroscopic) ob-
jects. As explained in the previous section, the straightforward and natural
response to the contingent absorber problem just sketched involves incor-
porating the absorber (the anti-particle) into the TI pseudotime analysis,
rather than treating it as part of the environment. But such incorporation
is far more problematic if we need to incorporate the state of a macroscopic
object into our TI analysis. There are two tricky issues that arise when one
contemplates treating a macroscopic object as falling within the scope of a
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TI analysis. The rst issue concerns whether the proposed analysis even
makes sense; it depends on the way in which TI practitioners conceive of
their theory. The second issue concerns the nuts and bolts of constructing
such an analysis, given that it makes sense.
To understand the rst issue, a little broad-brush history will help. In
broad terms, there are two traditions in the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. The rst, harkening back to Bohr and Heisenberg, takes the dis-
tinction between the quantum world and the classical world as basic; call
this the Copenhagen tradition. According to this tradition, the world (or at
least, the part of it relevant to a given experiment) divides into system and
apparatus. The apparatus belongs to the world of experience, and behaves
classically. The apparatus delivers results which we take to be produced by
an unseen micro-world. Quantum mechanics does not describe the workings
of this micro-world directly, but rather describes what we should expect to
see when the apparatus interacts with the system. On this view, the sys-
tem/apparatus divide is built into the theory of quantum mechanics; the
observables of the theory correspond to the operations of applying various
pieces of macroscopic measuring equipment to the quantum system. Quan-
tum mechanics applies to the interaction between classical measuring devices
and quantum systems, and so any attempt to apply quantum mechanics to
the measuring equipment itself is fundamentally misguided.
The TI can be understood as part of this Copenhagen tradition as a
way of making it more precise. Emitters and absorbers are part of the clas-
sical world; we arrange them in constructing an experiment, and we observe
the results they present. TI quantum mechanics generates probabilistic pre-
dictions based on the particular arrangement of emitters and absorbers we
have constructed. On this understanding of the TI, it is about the inter-
action of an unseen quantum world with a given arrangement of emitters
and absorbers; the arrangement of emitters and absorbers constitutes the
environment in which the TI analysis takes place. If we understand the TI
in this way, of course, then the straightforward route to resolving Maudlins
challenge is blocked as a matter of principle; there is no way round.
But there is a second tradition in the interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, stretching from Einstein and Schrödinger through Bell to Maudlin; call
this (without too much prejudice, I hope) the realist tradition. According
to this tradition, quantum mechanics really does describe the workings of
the micro-world, not just system/apparatus interactions. The observables of
quantum mechanics should not be conceived in terms of measurement opera-
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tions, but in terms of actual properties of the quantum system. On this view,
there is no signicant distinction between the micro-world and the macro-
world; quantum mechanics applies just as much to the latter as to the former,
since macroscopic systems are built out of microscopic ones. Hence quan-
tum mechanics can be applied unproblematically to the measuring devices
themselves.
There is no reason in principle why the TI cant be thought of in these
terms, and in fact several of those who have developed the TI explicitly do so.
Chiatti, for example, writes that a piece of common matteris actually an
aggregate of transactions which take place in enormous numbers per second
and per cubic centimeter(2012, 18), and Kastner writes that a macroscopic
observed eventis generally the product of an enormous number of trans-
actions(2013, 156). Furthermore, there are other retrocausal approaches to
quantum mechanics that clearly fall into the realist camp, for example the
approaches of Price (1994), Sutherland (2008) and Wharton (2010). If we
think of quantum mechanics in this way, the rst tricky issue is a non-issue;
there is nothing in principle to prevent the incorporation of a macroscopic
absorber into a retrocausal analysis.
It is worth noting here that the realist tradition faces a problem that
doesnt arise in the Copenhagen tradition; quantum mechanics treats mea-
surements di¤erently from non-measurements (only the former trigger col-
lapse), but if measurements are themselves quantum processes this distinc-
tion cannot arise. Various responses to this measurement problem have been
developed, and it is interesting that the three major ones all treat Maudlins
experiment by including absorber B in the system to be analyzed. This
is most obvious in the Everett (many-worlds) theory. Applying Everett to
Maudlins original experiment yields the following nal state:
1p
2

jLip jY iA jN;LiB + jUip jNiA jY; UiB

; (3)
where jY iA and jNiA are states of A in which it does and does not absorb a
particle, and jN;LiB and jY; UiB are states of B in which it doesnt absorb
a particle and remains on the lower branch, and does absorb a particle after
swinging to the upper branch. The existence of these two terms, according
to the Everettian, explains the observed results; in one branch of reality the
particle takes the lower path and is absorbed by A, and in the other branch
of reality the particle takes the upper path and absorber B swings round to
absorb it there. Bohms hidden variables theory tells essentially the same
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story, except that one branch is associated with the Bohmian particles, and
hence corresponds to the actual result. The GRW collapse theory appeals to
the instability of (3) under its collapse dynamics to account for the fact that
the nal state is (close to) one of the two terms. The lesson (to generalize
a little) seems to be that one has to incorporate absorber B into the quan-
tum mechanical analysis if one is to give an adequate realist account of the
Maudlin experiment.3
As mentioned above, provided that the TI is seen as a direct account
of the micro-world in the spirit of the realist tradition, there is nothing to
prevent it doing just that. But the details of how this is to be accomplished
remain somewhat murky; this is the second tricky issue advertised above.
The immediate problem is that TI analysis (as it stands) admits only two
kinds of end-points emission events and absorption events. To be subject to
TI analysis, particles must be followed from birth to death. But the particles
that make up the absorbers are not emitted at the start of the experiment
or absorbed at the end. If we have to know the full life-history of all the
particles that make up the absorbers before we can apply this version of the
TI, it becomes impossible to apply.
However, the details of the evolution of the particles in the absorbers
before and after the experiment seem irrelevant to the analysis at hand. So
perhaps we can avail ourselves of the following harmless myth; pretend that
all the particles involved in the analysis are created at the beginning of the
experiment and destroyed at the end. This myth might be justied by ap-
pealing to the fact that wherever and whenever the particles in the absorbers
are actually created and destroyed, the o¤er and conrmation waves over the
course of the experiment will correspond to their mythical counterparts. If
that justication works, and the myth is adopted, then a pseudotime nar-
rative for Maudlins original experiment can be given along the lines of the
previous section.
Here is how it goes. According to the myth, the test particle and all the
particles in the absorbers are emitted at the beginning of the experiment. Let
us write the initial o¤er wave as jOip jNiA jN;LiB (using the same notation
as above), since initially A and B have not absorbed a particle and B is on the
3Kastners PTI does not incorporate absorber B into the quantum mechanical
analysis indeed, it cannot do so in principle, since macroscopic objects are systems of
completed transactions according to the PTI, and hence cannot appear in quantum su-
perpositions. However, I argued above that Kastners PTI does not successfully respond
to Maudlins objection.
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lower path. The o¤er wave for the particle is split by the beam-splitter into
two equal components, following the lower path and upper path respectively;
at this stage, we can write the total o¤er wave as
1p
2

jLip + jUip

jNiA jN;LiB : (4)
The term jLip jNiA jN;LiB in (4) evolves to jLip jY iA jN;LiB, and the term
jUip jNiA jN;LiB evolves to jUip jNiA jY; UiB; hence the superposition state
(4) as a whole evolves to the later(in pseudotime) superposition state
1p
2

jLip jY iA jN;LiB + jUip jNiA jY; UiB

: (5)
Note that (5) is exactly the same as the Everettian nal state (3). Applying
the myth again, we assume that the test particle and all the particles in the
absorbers are destroyed at this point, so that each term in (5) returns a conr-
mation wave; the rst term returns a conrmation wave 1p
2
hLjp hY jA hN;LjB,
and the second term returns a conrmation wave 1p
2
hU jp hN jA hY; U jB. Hence
the source receives two conrmation waves, and a transaction forms along one
of the o¤er-conrmation pairs with probability 1=2 each. This pseudotime
narrative successfully ascribes probabilities of 1/2 each to the two possible
transactions the one in which the particle takes the lower path and B stays
put, and the one in which the particle takes the upper path and B swings
round.
As before, one may not want to take this pseudotime narrative literally;
it is the fact that the narrative provides a consistent probability assignment
to the outcomes that is signicant. Taking a realist view of Maudlins exam-
ple, one can regard the analysis as describing two possible four-dimensional
standing waves, standing waves that include both the particle and absorber
B, with the relevant fragment of the pseudotime narrative functioning as a
recipe for assigning probabilities to the two possibilities. Furthermore, one
can carry this lesson over to retrocausal approaches in general; as long as a
given retrocausal approach permits the application of quantum mechanics to
the motion of absorber B, Maudlins challenge is soluble.
7 Transactions and trajectories
The analysis just sketched constitutes what I take to be the most natural, and
perhaps the only, available solution to Maudlins challenge (at least among
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block-universe realist accounts). But at what cost have we arrived at this
solution? We have had to nd a way to incorporate pieces of measuring equip-
ment into a TI-style analysis. Those who regard the TI as a Copenhagen-style
interpretation and those who regard it as a dynamic A-theory may object that
we have left the TI behind at this point. But whether the account sketched
above should count as a version of the TI or a new retrocausal theory is not
of central concern; the main issue is whether retrocausal interpretations in
general can respond to Maudlins challenge. Still, even from this broader
perspective, some may nd the price of incorporating macroscopic objects
into the analysis too high, and with good reason.
At issue is the uniqueness of classical trajectories in retrocausal quan-
tum mechanics. It is important to note that TI transactions are not always
particle trajectories. Two-slit interference is a case in point; the completed
transaction goes through both slits to a point on the screen, so the trans-
action is not a determinate particle trajectory, but a superposition of such
trajectories. In fact, this is a generic feature of interference; whenever two
or more distinct o¤er waves contribute to the amplitude at the absorption
point, the resulting transaction incorporates the trajectories corresponding
to all the o¤er waves to that point. So the TI-style theories do not always re-
cover determinate particle trajectories in the way that, for example, Bohms
theory does. But provided such indeterminacy is kept conned to the micro-
world, this is arguably not a problem.
The worry about incorporating macroscopic objects into a TI-style analy-
sis is that it opens the door for macroscopic objects to have indeterminate
trajectories. Thanks to decoherence, interference e¤ects are tiny for macro-
scopic objects, but they do not go away entirely. So in my treatment of the
Maudlin experiment above, the amplitudes of the terms in (5) are a¤ected
by the presence of anomalous interference terms. For example, there are low-
amplitude terms in which the particle takes the lower path, tunnels through
absorber A without triggering it, and then veers over to the upper path to be
absorbed by B. So in reality, the wave amplitude at the upper-path location
for B includes tiny contributions from o¤er waves that have not travelled
via the upper path. According to the TI, then, the completed transaction
contains a large contribution following the standard trajectory, but also mi-
nor contributions following the anomalous trajectories. This might seem to
threaten the determinacy of trajectories for macroscopic objects, either ren-
dering the TI empirically inadequate or turning it into a baroque version of
Everett.
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But perhaps such worries can be deected; the additional terms are, after
all, very small. One might quite reasonably insist that a transaction in
which one trajectory is so dominant simply is, for all practical purposes,
that trajectory. Provided that no signicant interference occurs involving
macroscopic objects, the determinacy of macro-trajectories is (arguably) safe.
However, there is a further worry that cannot be dealt with in this way. If
the TI is interpreted in the realist tradition, there is nothing to prevent it
being applied to the state of the universe as a whole (just as Everett, Bohm
and GRW can be so applied). Indeed, this is one of the touted advantages
of the realist tradition. We wouldnt need the myth for such an application;
we really would be following every particle from birth to death. But there
is no guarantee that interference between macroscopically distinct terms can
be suppressed in such an application; it depends on the global structure of
the universe. For example, in highly symmetric universes, branching in the
initial stages of the universe might be matched by reverse branching(i.e.
interference) in the nal stages. In that case, there would be no unique
trajectory corresponding to the evolution of the macroscopic objects in the
universe, and again the TI would either be empirically inadequate or reduce
to a version of Everett.
How far do these worries carry over to other retrocausal approaches? In
large part, the answer depends on the underlying ontology of the theory con-
cerned. Some retrocausal approaches, such as that of Wharton (2010), are
similar to the TI in that systems are modelled in terms of waves. So as in
the TI, we would need some assurance that the waves that represent macro-
scopic objects are always well localized, and this might ultimately depend
on cosmology. Other retrocausal approaches, such as that of Price (1994),
model systems entirely in terms of the properties of localized particles. Such
approaches are clearly immune to the concerns raised above, since all ob-
jects are always well localized in such models.4 A third set of retrocausal
approaches, such as the retrocausal Bohmian approach of Sutherland (2008),
models systems in terms localized particles that are guided by waves. These
approaches are also immune to the concerns raised above, since even if the
global wavefunction of the universe is a superposition of macroscopically dis-
tinct terms, the particles will all be associated with one of these terms.
These non-TI retrocausal approaches are all in their infancy, and time
4See also Price and Wharton (2013), which is non-commital between a wave and a
particle ontology.
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will tell if the general strategy proves fruitful in understanding quantum
mechanics. The main point I hope to have defended here is that for any
such approach, provided it can be understood within the realist tradition in
quantum mechanics, and provided it can be applied to model the trajectories
of macroscopic objects, Maudlins challenge is not fatal.
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